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Abstract
Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just
in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers,
following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion
that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of mediocre lives whose
existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the
lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant conclusion, as well
as its analogues involving suffering populations and the lengths of individual lives. The
theory is grounded in some independently plausible views about the structure of well-
being, identifies a new source of incommensurability in population ethics, and avoids
some of the implausibly extreme consequences of other lexical views, without violating
the intuitive separability of lives.
1 Introduction
According to
Totalism: One distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains
a greater sum of well-being than the other.
Many philosophers, following Parfit (1984), reject totalism on the grounds that it entails
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The Repugnant Conclusion: For any number of excellent lives, there is some number of
mediocre lives whose existence would be better.
Consider, for example, a population of ten billion flourishing human beings. Totalism seems
to imply that it would be better if there were instead some much larger number of psycho-
logically simple creatures—e.g., oysters or newborn infants—whose short lives were filled
only with mild pleasures. As Parfit (2016, 110) puts it, “There might be [a greater sum of
happiness] in the lives of many people who each had very little happiness, just as theremight
be some greater mass of milk in a vast heap of bottles that each contained only one drop.”
To avoid the repugnant conclusion, many philosophers have suggested alternatives to
totalism. But these alternatives have consequences that seem even more implausible than
the repugnant conclusion, and none of them can claim the allegiance of more than a handful
of philosophers. The search for a plausible alternative to totalismmay, to some, have the feel
of a degenerating research program.
Some philosophers suggest that, in light of the failure to develop a plausible alterna-
tive to totalism, we should embrace the repugnant conclusion, claiming that its intuitive
repugnance is misleading. Many of these philosophers surmise that we find the repugnant
conclusion repugnant because we underestimate the value of a life that is barely worth liv-
ing.1 We think of the excellent lives as much like our own, and the mediocre lives as very
much worse than ours. But perhaps our lives, those of affluent Westerners, are barely worth
living. If we have a sufficiently high standard for a life worth living, then we may no longer
find the repugnant conclusion repugnant. And if we are willing to accept the repugnant
conclusion, then perhaps we should embrace totalism after all.
There is, however, a negative analogue of the repugnant conclusion, which becomes
even more repugnant as our standard for a life worth living increases. According to the
negative repugnant conclusion, for any number of horrible lives, there is some number of
people whose existence would be worse, even though each of their lives would be very nearly
worth living.2 This negative repugnant conclusion seems, tomany people, no less repugnant
than the original repugnant conclusion. But it is especially repugnant if we have a high
standard for a life worth living.3 If, for example, the lives of most affluent Westerners are
barely worth living, then a life that is very nearly worth living might be only slightly worse
than those of most affluent Westerners. But it seems repugnant that some population of
1For example, Tännsjö (2002); Ryberg (2004); Huemer (2008).
2See Blackorby et al. (1998); Carlson (1998).
3As Mulgan (2002) observes.
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people whose lives are only slightly worse than those of most affluent Westerners would be
worse than one of, say, billions of people who are tortured for their entire lives.
Totalism seems to entail both the repugnant and negative repugnant conclusions. The
repugnant conclusion seems very hard to avoid. And if we try to make the repugnant con-
clusion seem acceptable, the negative repugnant conclusion seems even worse. So it seems
that totalism will have unacceptable implications no matter what.
In this paper, I speculatively develop a version of totalism that avoids the repugnant
conclusion, along with its negative analogue. I am not the first to suggest that totalism can
avoid the repugnant conclusion. Griffin (1988, 340, n. 27) observes that arguments for
the repugnant conclusion questionably assume that well-being is “measurable on a single
continuous additive scale, where low numbers, if added to themselves often enough, must
become larger than any initial, larger number.” Others point out that, by rejecting this struc-
tural assumption, totalists can avoid the repugnant conclusion.4 However, few philosophers
seem to have taken this suggestion very seriously. Most writers on population ethics sim-
ply assume that totalism entails the repugnant conclusion.5 This assumption is reasonable
because no one, to my knowledge, has developed a plausible version of totalism that makes
good on Griffin’s suggestion. It is far from clear how quantities of well-being can be aggre-
gated and compared in a sensible way that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant conclusion.
The main task of this paper is to explore how that might be done.
The theory of welfare aggregation sketched in this paper appeals to a kind of lexical
superiority, which I motivate and relate to the repugnant conclusion in section 2. The idea
that some goods might be lexically superior to others is not new, of course. It is at least as
old asMill (1863); some attribute it to Aristotle. But lexical superiority, as it is standardly de-
veloped and understood, is implausibly extreme and open to seemingly decisive objections.
Even Rawls, who assigns lexical priority to the basic liberties in his theory of justice, thinks
that “in general, a lexical order cannot be strictly correct” (1999, 40). What is most novel
and important about the theory studied here is how it makes progress on these problems.
I develop the theory and explain how it can help address some longstanding problems for
lexical superiority in sections 3–5. Although my discussion focuses on lexical superiority in
well-being, particularly in the context of population ethics, my strategy may be of indepen-
dent interest, for example, to the growing literature on lexical tradeoff structures in decision
4See Crisp (1988); Portmore (1999); Kitcher (2000); Thomas (2018); and Carlson (n.d.).




In this section, I explain how some number of excellent lives could contain a greater sum of
well-being than any number of mediocre lives. This may seem impossible because we tend
to assume that well-being has a certain structure, which I describe below. This structural
assumption leads totalism to the repugnant conclusion and its ilk. I explain how we can
reject this assumption, thereby avoiding the repugnant conclusion and its negative analogue.
In discussions of population ethics, writers typically represent distributions of well-
being via boxes or lists of real numbers, where the height of a box or the number in a slot
represents the value of a life or lives. A neutral life, which marks the boundary between
good lives and bad lives, is normalized to zero. The value of an excellent life might then be
represented by a number greater than or equal to 100; the value of a life that is barely worth
living may be represented by a positive number less than or equal to 1. If our numbers
faithfully represent these values, then this means that an excellent life is at least 100 times
better than a life that is barely worth living.
This kind of representation encourages the assumption that well-being is a scalar
quantity—that is, a quantity that can be represented by a single real number. The as-
sumption that well-being has the structure of the real numbers is significant. For the real
numbers satisfy the Archimedean property: for any positive real numbers x and y, there
is some natural number n such that nx > y. If the value of an excellent life and that of a
mediocre life can be faithfully represented by positive real numbers, then, for any number
of excellent lives, there must be some number of mediocre lives whose existence would
contain more total value—no matter how little value is added by each mediocre life, and no
matter how much value is added by each excellent life. (Recall Parfit’s analogy to drops of
milk.) Totalism therefore leads straight to the repugnant conclusion.
But well-being is not like milk: it has many dimensions and is not, as Sen (1980) puts
it, a “homogeneous magnitude” (193). It is a substantive and controversial assumption that
these distinct values, as they are realized in any life, can be reduced to a scalar quantity.
To illustrate the importance of this insight, consider a single-person analogue of the
repugnant conclusion. McTaggart (1927, Volume II:452–53) imagines two lives. One life
lasts for a million years and is excellent throughout with respect to “knowledge, virtue, love,
6See Tversky (1969); Luce (1978); Manzini and Mariotti (2012).
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pleasure, and intensity of consciousness.” The other, “oyster-like” life has “very little con-
sciousness,” has “a very little excess of pleasure over pain,” and is “incapable of virtue or
love.” McTaggart thinks that, if the oyster-like life is long enough, it would be better. Call
thisMcTaggart’s conclusion. As McTaggart predicts, many of us find this conclusion repug-
nant.7
It is a desideratum of a solution to the repugnant conclusion that it can be extended
in a natural way to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion. There are, of course, important differ-
ences between the two conclusions. For example, there is someone for whom an extended
life is better, but, some philosophers believe, there is no one for whom an expanded popu-
lation is better. Other things being equal, however, a uniform solution to the two problems
seems preferable. To see this, consider what we might call themundane conclusion: for any
number of very long oyster-like lives, there is some number of very short oyster-like lives
whose existence would be better. This conclusion is not repugnant or even implausible. If,
as I believe, we should accept the mundane conclusion, then our diagnosis of the repugnant
conclusion should appeal to the richer values that characterize excellent lives and distinguish
them from mediocre (e.g., oyster-like) lives.
McTaggart’s conclusion might be avoided in a number of different ways. One possi-
bility is that the marginal value of pleasure diminishes quickly enough that there is a finite
upper bound on the value of a life that contains only pleasure. As the life gets arbitrarily
long, its value approaches a finite limit, which might be less than the value of an excellent
life of sufficient length.
I find it hard to believe that pleasure has diminishing marginal value for the person
who experiences it. Pleasure might plausibly have diminishing marginal value for creatures
who get bored, or who can remember their past experiences. But we can imagine that the
oyster-like creature has neither of these features. Intuitively, the second half of this creature’s
life could add just as much value to its life as the first half. The two halves might even involve
qualitatively identical experiences. But even if an appeal to diminishingmarginal value were
plausible in the intrapersonal case, it is less plausible in the interpersonal case. Appeals
to diminishing marginal value violate the intuitive separability of lives.8 The goodness of
conferring some benefit on one person, or of bringing some people into existence, intuitively
should not depend on how many other people enjoy that benefit or already exist—e.g., on
distant planets. The separability of lives can neatly explain why, when making decisions
7See also McMahan (1981); Parfit (1986); Cowen (1989); Temkin (2012).
8Broome (2004); see also Mulgan (2001).
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that impact population size or well-being, we can ignore the welfare of unaffected people on
distant planets. But if lives had diminishing marginal value, then a life’s contribution to the
value of an outcomewould depend on howmany other people exist, and on howwell off they
are. So, assuming that the effects of our choices on the value of outcomes sometimes bear
on what we ought to do, facts about unaffected people on distant planets would sometimes
bear on what we ought to do. That seems hard to believe. I, therefore, doubt that an appeal
to diminishing marginal value is the best way to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion.
It may seem impossible to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion if additional pleasure always
makes a life better, by some nondiminishing amount. That is what McTaggart thought. But
the apparent impossibility relies on a scalar conception of well-being. Suppose that the value
of any life can be represented by a real number, and that ingredients of well-being—the kinds
of things that make life worth living—increase the value of that life by a nondiminishing
amount. Let some positive real number y represent the value of an excellent life that lasts for
a million years. And suppose that each year of the oyster-like life is good to degree x (where
0 < x < y). There must, by the Archimedean property, be some natural number n such that
nx > y. So an oyster-like life, if sufficiently long, could contain enough pleasure so that its
value would exceed that of the excellent life.
Suppose, however, that we reject a scalar conception of well-being. We might follow
Sen in viewing well-being as fundamentally a vector quantity—i.e., representable as a list of
components. For simplicity, suppose that the ingredients of well-being can be reduced to
two dimensions, which (following Kitcher 2000) we can call the important (i) and the trivial
(t). Suppose that the values of both dimensions can be represented by real numbers with no
upper or lower bound. I wish to remain neutral regarding the content of these dimensions of
well-being. But, for purposes of avoiding McTaggart’s conclusion, the important dimension
might include things like virtue, knowledge, and friendship, with the trivial dimension being
restricted to mild sensory pleasures.
These vectors might be ordered lexically—first, by their values along the important di-
mension and, second, by their values along the trivial dimension. More precisely, according
to what we’ll call the standard lexical ordering, (i1; t1) ≥ (i2; t2) iff either
(a) i1 > i2, or
(b) i1 = i2 and t1 ≥ t2.
The standard lexical ordering entails that if one life is better than another along the impor-
tant dimension, then it is better overall. Between two lives that are equally good along the
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important dimension, the better one is the one that is better along the trivial dimension.
This ordering can easily be generalized to any number of dimensions.9
If the mild pleasures of an oyster-like life increase its value only along the trivial di-
mension, then the standard lexical ordering allows us to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion. No
matter how long the oyster-like life is, its value will never surpass a life that is good in the
important ways.
Many conceptions of well-being fit this kind of structure. Mill is often held to believe
that the higher “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral
sentiments” are lexically superior to the lower pleasures of “mere sensation” (1863, ch. 2).
Ross places virtue “at a point higher on the scale of value than that which pleasure ever
reaches” (1930, 150). And Gurney (1887) suggests that some duration of torture would be
worse than any duration of moderate pain. On these views, some dimensions of well-being
(or ill-being) have lexical priority over others, in the sense that at least some gain or loss along
the more important dimensions outweighs any gain or loss along more trivial dimensions
of value.
Somemight characterize the difference in value as infinite. But, following Rabinowicz
(2003), we should distinguish between infinite and lexical superiority. One reason is that, if
some good is infinitely valuable, then the expected value of any act with nonzero probability
of realizing that good is also infinite, so we cannot discriminate between the expected values
of acts with different nonzero probabilities of realizing that good. Lexical views raise other
problems in uncertain cases (as we’ll see in section 5), but they avoid this one. Moreover, if
some good is infinitely more valuable than another, then any dose of the higher good, how-
ever small, would outweigh any amount of the lower. That is true for the standard lexical
ordering above, but we’ll later consider a kind of lexical superiority that avoids this conse-
quence. Before we depart from the standard lexical ordering, though, let’s see how this kind
of structure would allow totalists to avoid the repugnant conclusion.
Say that a life is neutral iff it is neutral in the important ways (i = 0) and in the trivial
ways (t = 0), that a life is barely worth living iff it is neutral in the important ways (i = 0) and
good in the trivial ways (t > 0), and that a life is excellent only if it is good in the important
ways (i > 0). Vector quantities of well-being can be added by adding their components:
the sum of (i1; t1); : : : ; (in; tn) is (∑nk=1 ik ;∑nk=1 tk ). The resulting sums can be compared by
the standard lexical ordering. Any population of excellent lives would then contain a greater
sum of well-being than any population of lives that are barely worth living, because the latter
9See Chipman (1960).
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will be worse along the important dimension.10 Totalism would then avoid the repugnant
conclusion.
This strategy can also allow totalists to avoid the negative repugnant conclusion that,
for any number of horrible lives, there is some number of lives that are very nearly worth
living whose existence would be worse. This conclusion can be avoided so long as a horrible
life is negative in the important ways (i < 0), and a life that is nearly worth living is neutral
in the important ways (i = 0) and negative in the trivial ways (t < 0). Any population of
horrible lives would then contain a lower sum of well-being than any population of lives
that are nearly worth living.
Some might be uncomfortable with my characterization of this strategy as consistent
with totalism. I can see two possible reasons for this discomfort. The first is our conception
of well-being as a vector quantity. But Sen (1980) makes a good case for why all proponents
of “utility-supported moralities,” on various theories of well-being, should prefer a vector
conception of utility. And vector quantities can be summed, just like scalar quantities. The
second is the lexical ordering of these vector quantities. But Chipman (1960, 221) goes so
far as to define utility as “a lexicographic ordering, represented by a […] vector with real
components.” And Mill is often interpreted as a utilitarian with something like a lexical
view about pleasure. So restricting “totalism” to exclude a lexical ordering of vector-valued
well-being levels seems to me unmotivated. The core commitment of totalism is preserved:
the more well-being, the better.
We might, however, worry that other versions of the repugnant conclusion could still
slip through the cracks.11 This would be true if the important components of well-being
could come in arbitrarily small amounts. For we could then imagine a vast population of
people who barely instantiate the important goods. And it may be repugnant to conclude
that some such population would be better than a smaller one in which people’s lives are
much better in the important ways.
A complete response to this objection would require a theory of well-being. This is
because wewould need to knowwhat the important things are like in order to knowwhether
they can come in arbitrarily small amounts, and whether it would be repugnant to conclude
10Cf. Kitcher (2000, 573). Kitcher describes but neither endorses nor defends this strategy; he emphasizes
that it “may just be a formal solution” to his impossibility theorem. Nor does he apply it to the negative or single-
life analogues of the repugnant conclusion. And, for reasons that emerge in sections 3–5, I reject the standard
lexical ordering to which Kitcher appeals. Similar remarks apply to Thomas (2018) and Carlson (n.d.), who
use formalizations much like Kitcher’s in response to Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems. See also List (2004,
130), who considers an aggregation function much like Kitcher’s in a very different context.
11This kind of objection is pressed by Ryberg (1996).
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that some population of people whose lives are barely good in the important ways would be
better than a smaller one in which people’s lives are much better in the important ways. I
wish to remain neutral about what makes life worth living. But there are, I believe, plausible
theories of well-being on which the objection can be answered.
On some views, the important dimensions of well-being cannot take arbitrarily small
values. The simplest cases involve binary dimensions. For example, the lives that are most
worth living might be ones that are meaningful12 or autonomous.13 Although people can
be more or less autonomous and have more or less meaningful lives, we might care most
about whether we are autonomous, or whether our lives are meaningful. We might think
that a world filled with enough free agents or meaningful lives, if they are sufficiently happy,
contains more of what makes live worth living than a world filled with any number of unfree
agents living meaningless lives, however happy they are. Such views could avoid seemingly
repugnant conclusions along the i-dimension.14
On other views, the important things can come in very small amounts, but a life that
is barely good in such ways would have to be quite good overall. This might be true if the im-
portant dimension is a composite of other values. Griffin (1988, 86), for example, holds that
a sufficiently long life with certain global properties—“satisfying personal relations, some
understanding of what makes life worth while, appreciation of great beauty, the chance to
accomplish something with one’s life”—would be better than any length of life containing
“just enough surplus of simple pleasure over pain to go on with it.” If a positive i-value re-
quires all of these features, then it need not be repugnant to conclude that a vast population
of lives with low i-value would be better than a smaller population in which people’s lives are
much longer and filled with even more of these goods. Many other philosophers have sug-
gested similar views, which give great weight to combinations of various goods and holistic
properties of lives.15
Sen’s own conception of the good life can be understood as a sort of hybrid of the ap-
proaches I have mentioned, appealing to combinations of valuable properties with coarse-
grained structure. Sen understands quality of life primarily in terms of “the capability to
achieve valuable functionings” (Sen 1993, 31, 1985). Functionings are states and activities
12Smuts (2013); see also Audi (2005); Frankfurt (1999); Wolf (2010).
13See Griffin (2002); Mulgan (2006).
14I supposed above that the important component can be represented by any real number. But, if we accept
a view like the ones mentioned in this paragraph, we might instead restrict the important dimension to two
(Kitcher 2000) or three (Manzini andMariotti 2012) values. Mandler, Manzini, andMariotti (2012) argue that
sequences of such coarse-grained criteria can serve as the basis for surprisingly rich models of rational choice.
15See, e.g., Broad (1938) on McTaggart’s conclusion, and Dorsey (2009) on “lives for headaches.”
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of a person—e.g., being well-nourished, being respected, working in meaningful ways, par-
ticipating in public life. Sen places great weight—on some interpretations, lexical weight16—
on one’s ability and liberty to achieve those functionings. Although capabilities can come
in degrees, we might care primarily about the presence or absence of a capability, so that
arbitrarily small improvements in capability do not improve one’s life along the important
dimension. And, because many different kinds of functionings matter, many different ca-
pabilities matter. As Sen (1985, 202) recognizes, there is also a kind of interdependence
between capabilities and functionings: some capability sets require valuable functionings
in the first place, and some functionings can only be manifested by choice and ability. It is,
therefore, plausible that if a person’s capability set is sufficiently rich, so that her life is at all
good in the important ways, then her life must be quite good all things considered. Sen’s
capabilities approach, so understood, can avoid intuitively repugnant conclusions along the
important dimension.
As these remarks suggest, totalism’s avoidance of seemingly repugnant conclusions is
no fait accompli. Much depends on what, in fact, makes life worth living. For example, he-
donists who reject the lexical priority of any pleasures or pains cannot avoid the repugnant
conclusion within the framework of totalism. But if totalists instead value combinations of
goods, or propertieswith coarse-grained structure, then they can avoid seemingly repugnant
conclusions along the important dimension. Some philosophers might hope for a solution
to the repugnant conclusion that is neutral between all substantive theories of well-being.17
But it seems to me that the plausibility of different methods of aggregating “the amount
of whatever makes life worth living” (Parfit 1984, 387) should depend on what one thinks
makes life worth living. We should not reject an otherwise attractive theory of interper-
sonal aggregation just because it is less plausible according to certain theories of well-being.
Indeed, it is progress to discover that different theories stand or fall together.
3 LexicalThresholds
We have seen how a scalar conception of well-being leads totalism to the repugnant conclu-
sion. I suggested that we follow Sen in viewing well-being as, fundamentally, a vector quan-
16See Nussbaum (2000) and Pettit (2001).
17I suspect that this hope motivates Parfit (1986)’s appeal to perfectionism, according to which any loss of
some of “the best things in life” makes things worse, no matter how much else is gained. Parfit doesn’t think
that there is less well-being in a world with fewer of the best things in life. Instead, he thinks that such a world
is worse, even though it may contain much more well-being.
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tity. This picture of the structure of well-being, along with a lexical ordering of well-being
vectors, would allow totalists to avoid the repugnant conclusion, the negative repugnant
conclusion, and McTaggart’s conclusion.
The standard lexical ordering, however, seems implausible. It entails that a single ex-
cellent life would be better than any number ofmediocre lives. It entails that a single horrible
life would be worse than any number of lives that are nearly worth living. And it entails that
a person’s life is improved by an arbitrarily small gain along the important dimension, no
matter how much she loses along the trivial dimension. These consequences seem extreme.
In this section, we’ll consider a new view which avoids these consequences.
3.1 Superiority and Noninferiority
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005) distinguish between two kinds of lexical superiority:
Strong Superiority: For any value-bearers x and y, x is strongly superior to y just in case
any quantity of x would be better than any quantity of y.
Weak Superiority: For any value-bearers x and y, x is weakly superior to y just in case some
quantity of x would be better than any quantity of y.
The standard lexical ordering implies that the important components of welfare are strongly
superior to the trivial components. That seems implausibly extreme. Most proponents of
lexical views in population ethics seem to have weak superiority in mind. Griffin, for ex-
ample, suggests that “[p]erhaps it is better to have a certain number of people at a certain
high level than a very much larger number at a level where life is just worth living” (1988,
340, emphasis mine). But it is not clear how totalists can maintain weak superiority without
collapsing into strong superiority. Let me explain.
I mentioned earlier that lives are intuitively separable: the contribution that a life
makes to the value of an outcome should not depend on the existence or welfare of other
people in the outcome. According to
Separability: For any populations X, Y, and Z, X is at least as good as Y just in case adding
X to Z would be at least as good as adding Y to Z—i.e., a population composed of X
and Z would be at least as good as a population composed of Y and Z.
This principle allows us, when assessing the effects of our acts on the goodness of outcomes,
to ignore the existence and welfare of people who are unaffected—e.g., people who are long
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dead or who exist on distant planets. But a problem arises if we accept, in addition to sepa-
rability, the following two principles:
Transitivity: For any value-bearers X, Y, and Z, if X is at least as good as Y, which is at least
as good as Z, then X is at least as good as Z.
Completeness: For any value-bearers X and Y, X is either better than, worse than, or just as
good as Y.
On these assumptions, weak superiority collapses into strong superiority (Jensen 2008). Sup-
pose that excellent lives are weakly but not strongly superior to mediocre lives. Then there
must be some number of excellent lives—say, ten billion—whose existence would be better
than any number of mediocre lives, but also some number of excellent lives—say, one—
whose existence would not be better than some number of mediocre lives—say, one million.
Completeness implies that one million mediocre lives would, therefore, be at least as good
as one excellent life. We could then apply separability: adding one million mediocre lives
to a population of one million other mediocre lives (i.e., two million mediocre lives) would
be at least as good as adding a single excellent life to that same population (i.e., one million
mediocre lives plus one excellent life); adding one million mediocre lives to a population of
one excellent life (i.e., one million mediocre lives plus one excellent life) would be at least as
good as adding a single excellent life to that same population (i.e., two excellent lives). By
transitivity, two million mediocre lives would be at least as good as two excellent lives. We
could then apply separability and transitivity again to conclude that three million mediocre
lives would be at least as good as three excellent lives. This reasoning can be iterated to show
that some number of mediocre lives would be at least as good as ten billion excellent lives.
But that is inconsistent with our hypothesis that ten billion excellent lives would be better
than any number of mediocre lives.
It does not matter which numbers we choose. If we accept separability, completeness,
and transitivity, then the weak superiority of excellent lives entails their strong superiority.
Strong superiority seems implausible. And I take transitivity as sacrosanct. Some
might reject separability. But, to the extent that the value of outcomes bears on what we
ought to do, separability is very attractive. Separability lets us easily explain why, when
making decisions that affect population, we can ignore the welfare of people who are long
dead or who exist on distant planets. And it is a core feature of totalism. Without separabil-
ity, it is hard to see how the value of a population could be understood as the sum of each
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individual’s well-being. It is, at the very least, worth exploring possible views that maintain
separability while avoiding strong superiority.
I propose that totalists reject completeness: some populations are neither better than,
worse than, nor equally as good as some alternatives. Many people would independently
reject completeness in other contexts. Consider the albums Revolver and Rubber Soul. Nei-
ther seems better than the other. Nor do they seem equally good. We can imagine that the
Beatles added a great song to Revolver, resulting in Improved Revolver. Although Improved
Revolver might be better than Revolver, this need not make Improved Revolver better than
Rubber Soul. If Revolver and Rubber Soul were equally good, then Improved Revolver would
be better than Rubber Soul. So Revolver and Rubber Soul must not be equally good. These
two albums, many would argue, are incommensurable in value.
Similarly, totalists might judge some populations to be incommensurable with respect
to their sums of well-being, and therefore with respect to their value.18 This claim would al-
low totalists to maintain separability, transitivity, and the weak superiority of excellent lives,
while rejecting their strong superiority. Again, somemight resist my characterization of this
package of views as consistent with totalism, on the grounds that incommensurable quan-
tities of well-being cannot be summed. But, as we saw in section 2, vector quantities of
well-being can be summed component by component; this can be done regardless of how
the resulting sums are ordered (e.g., according to the standard lexical ordering or in some
other way that violates completeness, as we’ll soon see). Furthermore, totalists might reject
completeness for reasons having nothing to do with population ethics. For example, inter-
personal comparisons of well-beingmight be too imprecise, in principle, to yield a complete
ordering, but this is compatible with additive aggregation (as Sen 1970b emphasizes). And
many “ideal” utilitarians (e.g., Laird 1936, 256) reject completeness on the grounds that dif-
ferent goods are too heterogeneous to be compared with much precision.
Although totalists can deny that any number of excellent lives would be better than
any number of mediocre lives, they cannot allow any number of excellent lives to be worse
than any number of mediocre lives. We can distinguish between two kinds of noninferiority:
Strong Noninferiority: For any value-bearers x and y, x is strongly noninferior to y just in
case no quantity of x would be worse than any quantity of y.
18Many others have appealed to the idea of incommensurability in population ethics (see Bader, n.d.; Black-
orby, Bossert, and Donaldson 1996; Chang 2016; Frick 2017; Gustafsson 2019; Parfit 2016; Qizilbash 2007,
2018; Rabinowicz 2009). What primarily distinguishes the present proposal is the particular source of incom-
mensurability identified—i.e., in the structure of well-being—which raises independently interesting issues
even in fixed-population ethics (see Nebel 2019b).
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Weak Noninferiority: For any value-bearers x and y, x is weakly noninferior to y just in
case some quantity of x would not be worse than any quantity of y.
Excellent lives are strongly noninferior to mediocre lives just in case no number of excellent
lives would be worse than any number of mediocre lives. Excellent lives are weakly nonin-
ferior to mediocre lives just in case some number of excellent lives would not be worse than
any number of mediocre lives.
The repugnant conclusion is that, for any number of excellent lives, some number of
mediocre lives would be better. Avoiding this conclusion requires excellent lives to beweakly
noninferior to mediocre lives. But if excellent lives are weakly noninferior to mediocre lives,
then, given separability and transitivity, they must also be strongly noninferior to mediocre
lives.19 Suppose that excellent lives are not strongly noninferior to mediocre lives: there is
some number m of mediocre lives whose existence would be better than some number n
of excellent lives. We can show by induction that, for any natural number q, qm mediocre
lives would be better than qn excellent lives. The base case, in which q = 1, is given: we
have supposed that m mediocre lives would be better than n excellent lives. The inductive
step is that, for any natural number q, if qmmediocre lives would be better than qn excellent
lives, then (q + 1)m mediocre lives would be better than (q + 1)n excellent lives. To prove
the inductive step, assume that qmmediocre lives would be better than qn excellent lives. By
separability, (q+1)mmediocre lives would be better than qn excellent lives plusmmediocre
lives: it is better to add qmmediocre lives to a population ofmmediocre lives than it is to add
qn excellent lives to that same population. Moreover, the base case implies, by separability,
that qn excellent lives plusmmediocre lives would be better than (q+1)n excellent lives. By
transitivity, (q+1)mmediocre lives would be better than (q+1)n excellent lives. This proves
the inductive step. So, by induction, for any natural number q, qm mediocre lives would
be better than qn excellent lives. This would mean that excellent lives cannot be weakly
noninferior to mediocre lives. For there would then be some q such that qn excellent lives
would not be worse than any number, including qm, of mediocre lives. And we have just
shown that, without strong noninferiority, this is impossible. Therefore, given separability
and transitivity, weak noninferiority requires strong noninferiority.
If excellent lives are weakly noninferior to mediocre lives, then, given separability and
transitivity, theymust be strongly noninferior. But they needn’t be strongly superior, so long
as we reject completeness. If we were to assume completeness, then strong noninferiority
19The proof follows the same strategy as Jensen (2008), although Jensen’s assumes completeness and is con-
cerned with superiority, not noninferiority.
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would require strong superiority. For if no number of excellent lives would be worse than
any number of mediocre lives, and if not worse than implied at least as good as, then, for any
n and m, n excellent lives would be at least as good as m mediocre lives. Take n = 1. If a
single excellent life would be better than any number of mediocre lives, then we have strong
superiority. If a single excellent life would be just as good asmmediocre lives, then we are in
trouble. For, according to totalism, if mediocre lives are worth living, then for anym,m + 1
mediocre lives would be better than m mediocre lives. But if m + 1 mediocre lives would
be better than m mediocre lives, and if m mediocre lives would be just as good as a single
excellent life, then m + 1 mediocre lives would be better than a single excellent life. This
contradicts strong noninferiority, according to which no number of mediocre lives would
be better than any number of excellent lives. So the only option consistent with strong non-
inferiority when an excellent life is at least as good as m mediocre lives is for the excellent
life to be better. Therefore, if totalists were to assume completeness, then strong noninferi-
ority would collapse to strong superiority. By rejecting completeness, totalists can deny that
any number of excellent lives would be better than any number of mediocre lives. But they
cannot allow any number of excellent lives to be worse than any number of mediocre lives.
Some readers might balk at strong noninferiority. But it seems tomemuchmore plau-
sible than strong superiority. This is clearest in cases of risk, where (as we’ll see in section 5)
it seems hard for proponents of strong superiority to avoid absurd consequences. But it also
seems tome independently reasonable to accept strong noninferiority while rejecting strong
superiority. The difference between strong noninferiority and strong superiority may seem
negligible when we consider the axiological claims in the abstract. But strong noninferiority
and strong superiority differ greatly in their natural implications for what we ought to do.
Let me mention a few examples to illustrate the difference. Suppose, in these cases, that the
only relevant consideration is the goodness of outcomes, and that it is wrong to choose an
outcome just in case it is worse than some alternative.
Suppose that some prisonerwill be tortured formany years. We can either relieve a few
hours of her agony, or relieve the minor headaches of n people. If any amount of agony were
worse than any amount of mild discomfort, then it would be wrong to relieve the headaches,
no matter how large n is. But wemight think that if n is large enough, it would not be wrong
to relieve the headaches. Nor would it be wrong to relieve the few hours of torture, nomatter
how large n is. But if we could relieve the full duration of her torture, or even just a year of
it, I think it would be wrong to relieve the mild headaches instead.
Or suppose that n people’s lives are very nearlyworth living, and that one person’s life is
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excellent. We can benefit the n people by just enough to make their lives barely worth living,
but this would have the side effect of transforming the single excellent life into a horrible life.
If excellent lives were strongly superior to mediocre lives, and if horrible lives were strongly
superior (in disvalue) to lives that are nearly worth living, then it would be wrong to benefit
the n people, no matter how large n is. But we might think it permissible to benefit the n,
if n is large enough, albeit not obligatory, no matter how large n is. However, if there were
instead billions of excellent lives which would become horrible, it would seem to me wrong
to bring about this side effect by benefiting the n people in trivial ways, no matter how large
the n.
Or consider choices regarding a single life. Suppose that you have to make a decision
on your friend’s behalf. Her life will end in a few days, unless you put her in Nozick (1974)’s
experience machine, where she would enjoy mild sensory pleasure for n years. If real-world
goods were strongly superior to mild sensory pleasure, then it would be wrong to put her
in the experience machine, no matter how large n is. But we might think it permissible—
although not obligatory—to put her in the experience machine, if n is large enough. How-
ever, it would seem tomewrong to put her in the experiencemachine for any duration when
the alternative is several decades of good life in the real world. This suggests that real-world
goods are strongly noninferior, but not strongly superior, to mere sensory pleasure.
You might not share my judgments about these particular cases. The basic point,
though, is that strong noninferiority is much less extreme than strong superiority because it
leaves room for permissible tradeoffs between the important and trivial dimensions of well-
being. I do not find it plausible that the most important components of well-being ought to
be pursued at any trivial cost. But itmay bemore plausible that they areworth pursuing—i.e.,
that it is permissible to pursue them—at any trivial cost.
It is not enough, however, just to say that excellent lives are weakly superior and
strongly noninferior, but not strongly superior, to mediocre lives. We need a model of how
quantities of well-being can be compared in a way that makes good on these claims. That is
our next task.
3.2 MultipleThresholds
We are representing the sum of well-being in a distribution X as a vector (iX; tX), where iX is
the sum of the X-people’s well-being in the important dimension(s), and tX is the sum of the
X-people’s well-being in the trivial dimension(s). Some philosophers have considered the
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possibility of comparing distributions via the standard lexical ordering, according to which
X is at least as good as Y iff either
(1) iX > iY, or
(2) iX = iY and tX ≥ tY.
This ordering entails that important goods are strongly superior to trivial goods. If we reject
strong superiority, we need a different way of comparing quantities of well-being.
We might begin by imposing a single lexical threshold, understood as the lowest value
along the important dimension needed to outweigh any value along the trivial dimension.20
Let us represent this threshold by Δ. Consider the view that quantitiy of well-being (iX; tX)
is at least as great as quantity (iY; tY) just in case either
(1) iX − iY > Δ, or
(2) iX ≥ iY and tX ≥ tY.21
This view is a generalization of the standard lexical ordering, which is obtained in the special
case where Δ = 0. I assume that Δ is a finite value that doesn’t vary with the population or
other features of the distribution. The lexical threshold makes it possible that neither of two
populations is at least as good as the other, because one might have less of the trivial stuff
but not sufficiently more of the important stuff to exceed the lexical threshold. Consider,
for example, a population of one person whose life is excellent. This population might be
incommensurable with, not better than, a vast population of mediocre lives.
However, the partial ordering above has counterintuitive consequences when some
small gain along the important dimension is not enough to overcome the lexical threshold.
Such a gain cannot outweigh any loss along the trivial dimension, however great or small.
The “however great” side of this coin is, at least, more plausible than the analogous impli-
cation of the standard lexical ordering, which implies strong superiority. But the “however
small” side has no appeal. Suppose, for example, that A is better in the important ways than
B, but not by enough to exceed the lexical threshold (e.g., our one-person population), and
20Mulgan (2006) uses “lexical threshold” to refer to something quite different. I believe that my concept also
differs from Klocksiem (2015)’s notion of “threshold lexicality.”
21Some might wonder why we should appeal to the differences in i-values at all. Some might suggest that X
is better if iX exceeds both iY and some threshold Δ. But that would violate separability: whether X is better
than Y could depend on whether enough X-lives are excellent, even if those very same lives exist in Y.
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that B is barely better in the trivial ways (e.g., one short oyster-like life). The view under
consideration says that A is not at least as good as B. But that seems wrong.
We can avoid this problem by imposing an additional threshold δ on the trivial di-
mension. We can represent B’s trivial gain as 0 < tB − tA < δ. We might say that A’s slight
edge over B along the important dimension (0 < iA − iB < Δ) outweighs this slight loss along
the trivial dimension. But, if the trivial loss were much greater, so that it exceeded δ, then
A would no longer be better than B, nor would A be worse. We can define δ as the greatest
quantity along the trivial dimension that would be outweighed by a quantity of exactly Δ
along the important dimension: (Δ; 0) > (0; δ), but (Δ; 0) ≯ (0; δ + ε), for any ε > 0. We
might then formulate the partial ordering as follows:
The Lexical-Threshold View: For any quantities of well-being (iX; tX) and (iY; tY), (iX; tX)
is at least as great as (iY; tY) iff either
(1) iX − iY > Δ, or
(2) iX ≥ iY, and
(a) tX ≥ tY, or
(b) iX − iYtY − tX > Δδ .22
Condition (1) says that if X is better than Y in the important ways by more than Δ, then
X is at least as good as Y, no matter how much better Y is in the trivial ways. This secures
weak superiority. (2) then states the two other ways in which Xmight be at least as good as
Y. They both require X to be at least as good in the important ways. (2a) says that if X is
also at least as good in the trivial ways, then X is at least as good as Y. (2b) matters when X
is better than Y in the important ways by less than Δ, but worse than Y in the trivial ways.
It asks us to compare the ratio of the differences along each dimension to the ratio of each
dimension’s threshold. If the ratio of the important gain to the trivial loss exceeds the ratio
of Δ to δ, then X is at least as good as Y. This allows even small gains along the important
dimension to outweigh minuscule losses along the trivial dimension.
The lexical-thresold view view states conditions under which one quantity of well-
being is greater than another. It is compatible with many different views about how the
22These ratios are meaningful so long as each dimension can be measured on a ratio scale. The different
components of well-being needn’t share the same scale, any more than density requires mass and volume to
share the same scale.
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goodness of a distribution relates to its total quantity of well-being. Lexical-threshold total-
ism is the conjunction of the lexical-threshold view and totalism. The lexical-threshold view
allows totalists to claim that some number of excellent lives would be better than any num-
ber ofmediocre lives, and that, for any number of excellent lives, there is someworse number
of mediocre lives, without claiming that any number of excellent lives would be better than
any number of mediocre lives. Totalists can accept these claims—and analogous ones re-
garding negative well-being and length of life—by rejecting completeness and by imposing
thresholds on multiple dimensions of well-being. In the next two sections, I argue that, by
appealing to the lexical-threshold view, we can make progress on some of the most vexing
problems that seem to afflict lexical views in any context, not just population ethics.
4 Marginal Differences, Incompleteness, and Vagueness
Lexical superiority (whether weak or strong) is most plausible when there are differences
in kind, not merely of degree. But, as Parfit (1986, 20) observes, there are “fairly smooth
continua” between excellence (e.g., Mozart) and mediocrity (e.g., muzak). If the difference
between excellent lives and mediocre lives is one of degree, then it may be implausible to
appeal to any kind of lexical superiority in well-being.
Consider a finite sequence of lives, ranging from the excellent (x1) to themediocre (xn).
Each life xk might be qualitatively very similar to its successor xk+1, seeming only slightly
better with respect to each kind of thing that makes life worth living. Some philosophers
argue that if x1 were weakly superior to xn—i.e., if some number of x1-lives would be better
than any number of xn-lives—then some life xk would have to be weakly superior to its
successor xk+1.23 But it is implausible that some life should be so much better than a life that
is qualitatively so similar to it. These philosophers, therefore, reject weak superiority.
These philosophers seem to endorse the following sequence argument:
Suppose that no life in the sequence is weakly superior to its successor. Then, for
any number of xk-lives, somenumber of xk+1-livesmust be better. By transitivity,
for any number of x1-lives, some number of xn-lives must be better. So the
x1-lives couldn’t be weakly superior to the xn-lives. If the x1-lives were weakly
superior to the xn-lives, then some life in the sequencewould beweakly superior
23See Arrhenius (2005); Ryberg (2002).
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to its immediate successor. But it is absurd that some life should be so much
better than a life that is qualitatively so similar to it.
The sequence argument is an important challenge. But we can plausibly reject it. Propo-
nents of the lexical-threshold view can accept a smoother picture of our sequence of lives by
appealing, first to incommensurability and, second, to the vagueness of lexical thresholds.
Let me explain these points in turn.
First, the sequence argument slides from the rejection of weak superiority to the rejec-
tion of weak noninferiority. After supposing that no life in the sequence is weakly superior
to its successor, we inferred that, for any number of xk-lives, some number of xk+1-lives must
be better. This inference is good only if we assume completeness. But lexical-threshold to-
talists can reject completeness and allow for incommensurable values. So they can claim
that no life in the sequence is even weakly superior to its successor.
That response is simple, and it highlights another way in which incommensurability is
important. But it may not be entirely satisfying if we still have to admit that some life in the
sequence is weakly noninferior—and therefore strongly noninferior, given separability—to
its successor. For if no life is even weakly noninferior to its successor, then for any number of
xk-lives, theremust be some number of xk+1-lives whose existence would be better. We could
then show that, for any number of x1-lives, there must be some number of xn-lives whose
existence would be better, thereby undermining weak noninferiority. Given separability, we
seem forced to admit that some life in the sequence is strongly noninferior to its successor,
and that may still seem absurd.
My second response takes the form of a dilemma: either this conclusion is not absurd,
or we can reject it. My reasoning has to do with vagueness.
It is supposed to be absurd that some life is strongly noninferior to its successor be-
cause each life in the sequence is so similar to its successor. Each life should therefore be
“only marginally worse” than its predecessor (Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2005, 108). That is
why, intuitively, for every k, xk is not strongly noninferior to xk+1. Call this the key premise.
Compare the key premise to
The Conditional Premise: For every k, if xk is weakly superior to xn, then so is xk+1.
The key premise, given transitivity and separability, entails the conditional premise. For
suppose that the conditional premise is false: for some k, xk is weakly superior to xn but
xk+1 is not. So there is some number m of xk-lives whose existence would be better than
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any number of xn-lives. And suppose that the key premise is true, so that xk is not strongly
noninferior to xk+1. By separability and transitivity, xk cannot be weakly noninferior to xk+1.
So there is some number of xk+1-lives whose existence would be better than m xk-lives. By
transitivity, some number of xk+1-lives would have to be better than any number of xn-lives,
which contradicts our hypothesis that xk+1 is not weakly superior to xn.24
Assuming classical logic, however, we can derive from the conditional premise that
either all or none of the lives in our sequence are weakly superior to xn. Obviously not all of
the lives are weakly superior to xn. So, we might conclude, none of them are.
This reasoning, however, would be soritical, because it can be vague whether some xk
is weakly superior to xn. This is because it can be vague what the values of our thresholds
Δ and δ are, and whether some life is good in the important respects. For example, Griffin
suggests that “we might wish to stop the slide […] at that point along the line where people’s
capacity to appreciate beauty, to form deep loving relationships, to accomplish something
with their lives beyond just staying alive […] all disappear” (1988, 339). It can be vague
whether some person has or lacks these capacities.
The point can be put more generally. Suppose that, for every k, xk is weakly superior
to xn just in case xk is excellent. It is surely vague whether a life is excellent. But the condi-
tional premise then implies, assuming classical logic, that either all or none of the lives in
the sequence are excellent. That is clearly false.
The exact upshot of this point depends on how we resolve the sorites paradox. On
most theories that retain classical logic, the conditional premise is false. Those who prefer
such theories can reject the key premise of the sequence argument. That some life in the
sequence is strongly noninferior to its successor seems to me not much more implausible
than that some life is excellent even though its successor is not. Others claim that sorites
arguments have true premises but weaken classical logic so that the arguments are invalid.
Those who prefer such nonclassical theories can apply their preferred logic to the sequence
argument to avoid the seemingly absurd result.
I am not denying that the sequence argument raises a challenge. My claim is that this
challenge is an instance of a more general one: the sorites paradox.25 Some might find it
24Even if separability is rejected, we could derive the conditional premise from the key premise’s analogue
that, for every k, xk is not weakly noninferior to xk+1. Proponents of the sequence argument would, I suspect,
accept this weaker premise. See also Pummer (2017), who argues that reasons to accept principles like the key
premise also support principles like conditional premise, which give rise to transitivity-less analogues of the
spectrum arguments of Rachels (1998) and Temkin (1996).
25As I also claim, in Nebel (2018), of the Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against transitivity.
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objectionable for a moral theory to give such great weight to vague conditions.26 Although
there may be differences in kind between excellent and mediocre lives, betweenMozart and
muzak, the only axiologically relevant differences, some might think, are the differences in
degree on which these kind-differences supervene. On this view, we should not give lexical
weight to the seemingly arbitrary thresholds at which a life becomes excellent, an insight
becomes profound, some pain becomes agony, or some creative work constitutes a work of
genius. Goodness is a function only of the comparative, degree-based properties in virtue
of which things satisfy these vague, absolute conditions.
Commonsense morality, however, gives great weight to properties with borderline
cases.27 It may be morally wrong to harvest one innocent person’s vital organs in order to
save two lives, but morally obligatory to do so for the sake of a million lives. We may have a
duty to rescue a nearby child at little cost to ourselves, but no duty to donate nearly all our re-
sources to save a greater number of children on another continent. It may be vague whether
some act of consent was informed and freely given, and therefore, sufficient to make some
act morally permissible. It may be vague what one knows or intends, and yet the differences
between knowledge and ignorance, intent and foresight, may determine which actions are
negligent, which are reckless, which are warranted, which are blameworthy, andwhichmake
one liable to be harmed.
These examples are deontic ones. It might be objected that although binary judgments
about permissibility and wrongness may depend on such properties, axiological ones about
goodness may not. But many conceptions of the good can be expected to raise similar cases.
It may be borderline whether some life that contains both goods and evils is worth living
or not. And plausible non-hedonic components of well-being—e.g., knowledge, friendship,
and achievements—have borderline cases. We might also think that population size can be
vague because of vagueness in personal identity, and that it can be vague whether something
is painful. It seems that we will inevitably have to give great weight in our axiology to vague
conditions, so this problem is not unique to the lexical-threshold view.
Here is one way to sharpen the point. Consider a standard totalist who appeals to a
complete ordering of scalar quantities of well-being. Consider a sequence of lives from the
excellent to the horrible where each life is only marginally better than its successor—e.g.,
because it contains one more nanosecond of mild pleasure. The standard totalist holds that
26Bacon (2018), for example, argues that we should not care intrinsically about vague matters.
27These examples are based on Alexander (2008), though he seems to deny that there can be moral vague-
ness.
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any number of the first life would be better than any number of the last. She must conclude
that, for some life in the sequence, any number of such liveswould be better than any number
of its successor lives, containing one less nanosecond of pleasure. That seems implausible.
But the implausibility isn’t the fault of their theory of aggregation; it’s a general effect of
vagueness. It seems absurd for a nanosecond of pleasure to make the difference between a
life that is worth living and a life that isn’t. But if we cannot live with that consequence, then
we need some other solution to the sorites paradox, which we could reasonably expect to
solve the present problem.
The lexical-threshold view’s combination of vagueness and incommensurability sug-
gests a smoother picture than the one characterized by the sequence argument. Excellent
lives are weakly superior to mediocre lives. Had we assumed completeness, there would be
some life along a finite sequence from excellent lives to mediocre ones that was weakly supe-
rior to its immediate successor. But if we reject completeness, this life may instead be only
strongly noninferior to its successor. The vagueness of lexical thresholds explains why this
result seems incredible, even though it is not much more incredible than there being a pair
of extremely similar lives only one of which is excellent.28
5 The Problem of Risk
In this section, I discuss what seems to me the most serious problem for lexical views. The
problem arises in cases of uncertainty. Essentially the same problem afflicts deontological
theories that posit absolute moral prohibitions.29 Such theories seem to yield absurd results
when we are uncertain about whether our act constitutes the breaking of a promise, or the
intentional killing of an innocent person. Huemer (2010) argues that this problem afflicts
lexical views more generally—e.g., about well-being and population ethics.30
Imagine that we can donate some money to one of two charities.31 The trivial charity
would use our money to improve many people’s lives in trivial ways. We know that with cer-
28Broome (2004, 174) argues thatwe cannot combine vagueness and incommensurability; seeCarlson (2004,
2013) for counterexamples to Broome’s “collapsing principle.” Appeals to vagueness and incommensurability
in responding to sequence arguments have beenmore recently criticized by Handfield and Rabinowicz (2017);
see also Pummer (this volume) against vagueness.
29See Jackson and Smith (2006).
30Here I focus on Huemer’s objection, which involves interpersonal tradeoffs. In Nebel (2019a) I discuss a
risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The lexical-threshold view violates what I there
call “minimal prudence,” which I find very hard to reject.
31Huemer’s example is targeted at Parfit’s perfectionism. I have modified it to apply to the view sketched
here.
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tainty. The trivial charity might, for example, supply minuscule tubes of anti-itch ointment
or tasty lollipops to millions of people. And suppose we know that these goods will not lead
to improvements in people’s lives along the important dimensions. The important charity
would, with probability p, use our money to bring about some important good whose value
exceeds the threshold Δ. It might, for example, be an art school that, if better funded, would
bemore likely to train some number of artistic geniuses who would have otherwise gone un-
recognized. Or itmight be an organization that would, with probability p, free some number
of enslaved children.
Suppose that our only aim is to make things go best. If p = 1, then donating to the
important charity would certainly make things better in the important ways, by enough to
exceed the lexical threshhold. So lexical-threshold totalism says that we ought to donate
to the important charity, no matter how many people would be aided by the trivial charity.
Huemer then asks, “For what values of p would this remain true?” (2010, 338).
Huemer considers three possible answers. On one view, for any p > 0, we ought to
donate to the important charity, regardless of howmany people would be aided by the trivial
charity. This seems to imply that we should donate all of our resources to organizations with
vanishingly small probabilities of churning out artistic geniuses or freeing child slaves, rather
than charities that are much more likely to help people, even if only marginally.
On a second view, for any p < 1, there is some number of people who would be aided
by the trivial charity such that we ought to donate to that charity. But this would make our
lexical view irrelevant to practical deliberation, because we can never be certain that an act
would lead to the creation of artistic masterpieces or the freeing of child slaves.
On a third view, there is some probability 0 < p < 1—call it the risk threshold—above
which we ought to donate to the important charity, regardless of the number of people aided
by the trivial charity, and below which we ought to donate to the trivial charity. But suppose
that there are two important charities (call them A and B) in addition to the trivial charity
(call it C). We know that each of A and B has a probability slightly less than p of realizing
the important good. But if we were to donate to both A and B, the probability of realizing
an important good would exceed the risk threshold p. On the view under consideration, we
shouldn’t donate to A, and we shouldn’t donate to B, but we nonetheless should donate to
them both. That may seem absurd; it “puts value and probability together in a way that leads
to paradox” (Jackson and Smith 2006, 277).
Lexical-threshold totalism, however, suggests a different response. According to what
might be called the weak threshold view, there is some risk threshold 0 < p < 1—which
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depends on the magnitude of the possible tradeoffs along each dimension—above which we
ought to donate to the important charity, and below which it can be permissible to donate
to the trivial charity. But, for any p > 0, it is permissible to donate to the important charity.
The weak threshold view avoids the paradoxical result that we shouldn’t donate to
A, shouldn’t donate to B, and yet should donate to both A and B. And it flows naturally
from lexical-threshold totalism and the standard decision-theoretic obligation to maximize
expected value, on a natural understanding of expected value. We simply apply lexical-
threshold totalism’s partial ordering to vectors of expected values along each dimension.
That is, we represent the expected value of a prospect with probabilities p1; : : : ;pn of realiz-
ing values (i1; t1); : : : ; (in; tn), respectively, with the vector (∑nk=1 ik pk;∑nk=1 tk pk). The values
of prospects can then be partially ordered according to lexical-threshold totalism. We can
then claim that an act is permissible just in case no alternative has greater expected value.
This gives us the weak threshold view.
Some might object that the weak threshold view still has paradoxical implications. It
entails that there is no obligation to donate to A alone, that there is no obligation to donate
to B alone, but that we ought to donate to both A and B. And it may seem absurd that we
can permissibly refrain from donating to each charity, considered separately, if we ought to
donate to them both.
This result, however, is not absurd. We ought to donate to both A and B. But suppose
that we decide not to donate to A. Then we act wrongly. Is there any additional obligation
to donate to B? Is our act more seriously wrong if, given our decision not to donate to A,
we decide not to donate to B either, and instead give the entire sum to C? I do not see why
that would have to be so. The claim is not that we do no wrong in donating to neither of
the important charities. The claim is rather that we do no additional wrong in donating to
neither of the important charities, given that we are already committed to doing wrong by
not donating to them both.
More familiar cases instantiate this pattern of obligation. Suppose, for example, that
you have two cookies. You’ve promised, to me, that you’d give them tomy two children. You
ought to give them both a cookie. But suppose you decide to eat one cookie. It might not be
true that you do some additional wrong by eating the other cookie. You’ve already broken
your promise to me, and there might be sufficient reason not to give a cookie to only one
of my children. Or consider Quinn (1990)’s self-torturer, who receives $10,000 each time
he increases his pain by a negligible amount. We might think that each increase is rational,
but enough of them taken together are irrational. These examples suggest that there can
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be an obligation to do A and B, even if there is no independent obligation to do A and no
independent obligation to do B.
Some might object that, even if the weak threshold view can avoid the absurd con-
sequences faced by the other views we’ve discussed, it is nonetheless implausible that, for
any probability p and any number of people aided by the trivial charity, it is permissible to
donate to the important charity. That seems too permissive.32
Some might find this implication unpalatable on the grounds that, in practice, we al-
ways have some credence that an act could result in an important gain. But, for that very
reason, Huemer’s charity case is unrealistic. In practice, seemingly trivial benefits to a per-
son have some probability of yieldingmore important benefits, so that benefiting a very large
number of people in seemingly trivial ways might have a greater probability of realizing an
important gain than donating to a highly ineffective art school, for instance. So, although
the weak threshold view’s verdict about the charity case may bemore permissive than seems
plausible, it’s not obvious that this implausibility translates to a serious practical problem.
That’s not to say that the permissive implications of the weak threshold view are en-
tirely welcome. But these implications seem to me implausible only when the probability
of an important gain is minuscule. And it is well known that tiny probabilities raise serious
puzzles for expected utility theory. Suppose, for example, that an evil demon forces you to
choose between the following options. He will either
(1) Create and torture 10301 people for their entire lives, or
(2) Flip a fair coin until it lands heads, or until it has been flipped n times, whichever
happens first. If the coin lands heads on themth flip (m ≤ n), he will create and torture
2m people. If the coin lands tails n times, he will create and torture 2n+1 people.
Intuitively, it is at least permissible to choose option (2), for any n. Unless the coin lands
tails a thousand times in a row, (2) would result in fewer people tortured than (1). But, on
the plausible assumption that there is no upper limit to the badness of people being tortured,
and if n is large enough, then (2) would be worse in expectation than (1). (For example, if the
32On some understandings of incommensurable values, lexical-threshold totalism can secure the weaker
verdict that every rational agent ought to have some risk threshold or other, below which she would donate
to the trivial charity. This can be obtained by understanding the lexical threshold as the upper bound of a
permissible range of thresholds, which extends arbitrarily close to 0, and by requiring each agent to have some
threshold in that range. This would rule out a policy of donating to the important charity no matter how
unlikely the important gain. But there would be no particular threshold belowwhich everyone ought to donate
to the trivial charity.
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badness of torture is linear with respect to the number of people tortured, then let n ≥ 10301.)
So, for some n, expected utility theory requires you to choose (1). That is counterintuitive.
My point is that the implausible implications of the weak threshold view may be in-
stances of a more general difficulty for expected utility theory—namely, its counterintu-
itive verdicts when dealing with tiny probabilities—which I have simply applied to lexical-
threshold totalism. If that’s correct, then the axiology is not to blame. I have no solution to
the paradoxes of decision theory. But some proposed solutions—e.g., discounting tiny prob-
abilities down to zero33—would allow lexical-threshold totalism to avoid these difficulties.
On the other hand, perhaps the counterintuitive implications of standard decision theory
are to be embraced. But the permissive implications of the weak threshold view strike me
as no less implausible than the demanding implications of standard decision theory. Many
people do, in fact, donate large sums of money to causes that have very little chance of real-
izing important values, rather than charities that could (with near certainty) improve many
people’s lives in more trivial ways. So the permissiveness of the weak threshold view may
not be a decisive reason to reject lexical-threshold totalism.
6 Conclusion
Totalism leads to the repugnant conclusion and its negative analogue if we view well-being
as a scalar quantity. But if we follow Sen in viewing well-being as a vector quantity, and
if we respond to McTaggart’s conclusion by giving lexical priority to some dimensions of
well-being, then we can avoid these repugnant conclusions. By rejecting completeness and
imposing lexical thresholds on the dimensions of well-being, totalists can also avoid the im-
plausibly strong superiority of excellent lives, in away that preserves the intuitive separability
of lives. The resulting view—lexical-threshold totalism—can also mitigate the significance
of seemingly marginal differences in well-being, and avoids the most paradoxical implica-
tions of standard lexical orderings in uncertain cases.
Ultimately, the plausibility of lexical-threshold totalism depends on whether a reason-
able theory of well-being fits the structure of the lexical-threshold view. And I have not de-
fended any particular view about what makes life worth living. This makes lexical-threshold
totalism somewhat of a moving target: we cannot always say whether some implication of
the theory is repugnant, because we don’t know what the important and trivial dimensions
33See, e.g., Monton (2019), Shafer and Vovk (2006), and Smith (2014). For critique, see, e.g., Isaacs (2016)
and Parfit (1981).
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are. It, therefore, seems to me that research in the theory of well-being is of crucial impor-
tance to the problems of population ethics.
What I find most attractive about the lexical-threshold view is its diagnosis of the re-
pugnant conclusion’s repugnance. The repugnant conclusion is repugnant because it over-
simplifies what makes life worth living. Many philosophers compare the paradoxes of pop-
ulation ethics to Arrow’s (1951) impossibility result in the theory of social choice.34 The
solution to Arrow’s theorem, in the context of social welfare aggregation, is to require more
information about each person’s good: as Sen (1970a) emphasizes, we cannot get by with
merely ordinal information about what each person prefers. We need a richer framework of
well-being. The lexical-threshold view extends this insight to variable-population cases: we
cannot get by with merely scalar information about each person’s good, because no single
cardinal scale can accommodate the complexities of what makes life worth living and the
vast differences between lives of different qualities. Well-being is, in this way, unlike milk.
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